Abstract. Up to now, there was very little work on studying the revocation problem in existing hierarchical ID-based encryption (HIBE) systems. Certainly, all existing HIBE systems may inherit the revocation method suggested by Boneh and Franklin to revoke illegal or expired users, in which non-revoked users must periodically update their private keys using secure channels by contacting their ancestors in hierarchical structures. In this paper, we propose the first HIBE scheme with public revocation mechanism, called revocable HIBE (RHIBE), which is extended from Lewko and Waters's unbounded HIBE scheme presented in Eurocrypt 2011. We demonstrate that the proposed RHIBE scheme is fully secure while removing the requirement of secure channels for private key updating in Boneh and Franklin's revocation method. The public revocation mechanism is an exciting alternative to the existing revocation methods. Finally, we discuss the transformation technique from a HIBE scheme to a RHIBE scheme and employ it to another well-known HIBE scheme.
Introduction
In order to eliminate the need of certificates that make publicly available the mapping between identities and public keys in traditional public key systems, Shamir (1984) presented a good idea for public key systems, called identity (ID)-based public key system. In an ID-based public key system, a user's identity (e.g. name, e-mail address or social security number) is viewed as the user's public key. However, Shamir's system is not easy to be realized in practice. In 2001, Boneh and Franklin (2001) used Shamir's idea to propose the first practical ID-based encryption (IBE) scheme. In their IBE scheme, there are two roles: a trusted private key generator (PKG) and users at the same level. All users need to authenticate themselves to the PKG and then the PKG generates the corresponding private keys to the users. Following Boneh and Franklin's IBE system, a large number of literatures in the ID-based cryptography have been published such as Paterson (2002) , Cha and Cheon (2003) , Paterson and Schuldt (2006) , Chen et al. (2007) , Tseng et al. (2008) , Wu, et al. (2011) , Wu and Tseng (2012) , Chen et al. (2012) , in particular IBE (Boneh and Boyen, 2004a; Waters, 2005; Gentry, 2006; Boneh and Hamburg, 2008; Boldyreva et al., 2008; Bellare et al., 2011; Tseng and Tsai, 2012; Tsai et al., 2012) . However, many organizations have hierarchical structures, and users are distributed in different levels. Using Boneh and Franklin's IBE system cannot offer these organizations with hierarchical structure the flexibility of levels in sharing and managing sensitive data. For solving this problem, the PKG needs to delegate private keys to its subordinates. In addition, these subordinates in turn can keep delegating private keys further down the hierarchy to the users. Horwitz and Lynn (2002) first introduced a hierarchical IBE (HIBE) to meet the requirements above. Gentry and Silverberg (2002) then proposed the first fully functional HIBE system. Subsequently, the design of hierarchical ID-based encryption has received much attention from cryptographic researchers such as Boneh et al. (2005a) , Okamoto and Takashima (2009) , Waters (2009) , , Waters (2010, 2011) .
However, any public key system must provide a revocation mechanism to remove illegal or expired users from the system. For the revocation problem, Boneh and Franklin (2001) also suggested a revocation mechanism for ID-based public key systems, in which the PKG must generate new private keys for all non-revoked users in each period, and a secure channel must be established between the PKG and each non-revoked user to transmit the periodic private keys. To our best knowledge, no revocation mechanism is proposed for dedicating to the existing HIBE systems. Indeed, all existing HIBE systems may inherit the revocation method suggested by Boneh and Franklin to revoke illegal or expired users. As a result, non-revoked users must periodically update their private keys using secure channels by contacting their ancestors (or the root PKG) in hierarchical structures. In such a case, their ancestors and these non-revoked users must encrypt and decrypt periodic private keys, respectively.
In this paper, we address the revocation problem in HIBE systems. We will propose the first revocable HIBE (RHIBE) scheme with public revocation mechanism in the standard model, which is extended from Lewko and Waters's unbounded HIBE scheme (2011) . The involved public revocation mechanism is an exciting alternative to the existing revocation methods. In our proposed RHIBE scheme, non-revoked users and their ancestors do not require secure channels to transmit periodic private keys so that it can avoid enormous computation costs of encrypting/decrypting these periodic private keys. Finally, we discuss the transformation technique from a HIBE scheme to a RHIBE scheme. We believe that our transformation technique is suitable to construct RHIBE schemes from most of the existing HIBE schemes. Meanwhile, we employ the transformation technique to present another RHIBE scheme with public revocation mechanism in the random oracle model, which is extended from Gentry and Silverberg's HIBE scheme (2002).
Related Work
Boneh and Franklin (2001) used Shamir's idea to propose the first practical IBE system in the random oracle model. Although the IBE schemes based on the random oracle model can offer better performance, the resulting schemes could be insecure when random oracles are instantiated with concrete hash functions (Bellare et al., 2004) . For the IBE construction in the standard model, Canetti et al. (2003) presented an IBE scheme that is proven selectively secure in the standard model (without random oracle model). Subsequently, Boneh and Boyen (2004a) provided a more practical IBE scheme that is also proven selectively secure. Boneh and Boyen (2004a) furthermore presented a fully secure IBE scheme that is proven adaptively secure in the standard model. For improving the efficiency of Boneh and Boyen's IBE scheme, Waters (2005) also proposed an efficient IBE scheme in the standard model. However, Waters's IBE scheme had public parameters consisting of O(λ) group elements, where λ is the security parameter. Furthermore, Gentry (2006) proposed a new fully secure IBE scheme to reduce the number of public parameters required in Waters's construction, but it relied on a "q-type" assumption (meaning that the number of terms in the assumption depending on the number of queries q made by an attacker), called the augmented bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent (ABDHE) assumption (Gentry, 2006) . Waters (2009) provided a dual system encryption IBE scheme with short public parameters that is proven fully secure under the decisional linear and decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumptions.
Following the IBE system proposed by Boneh and Franklin (2001) , Horwitz and Lynn (2002) first introduced a hierarchical ID-based encryption (HIBE). Afterward, Gentry and Silverberg (2002) proposed the first fully functional HIBE system in the random oracle model. Boneh and Boyen (2004a) proposed a HIBE scheme that is proven selectively secure in the standard model, but in their HIBE scheme ciphertext size, private key size and the computational time required for decryption and encryption, grow linearly in the depth of the hierarchy. For reducing the ciphertext size, Boneh et al. (2005a) presented a HIBE scheme with constant size ciphertext. They proved that their HIBE scheme is selective-ID secure in the standard model and fully secure in the random oracle model. Boyen and Waters (2006) presented an anonymous hierarchical identity-based encryption in the standard model that features fully anonymous ciphertexts and realizes fully anonymous HIBE at all levels in the hierarchy. Gentry and Halevi (2009) presented a fully secure HIBE construction for polynomial depth, but it relies on a complex assumption. Under simple assumptions (the decisional linear and decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumptions), Waters (2009) proposed a fully secure dual system encryption HIBE scheme in the standard model. However, the ciphtext size of Waters's construction is dependent on the depth of the hierarchy. Note that the construction of Boneh et al. (2005a) has constant size ciphertext, but it was proven to be secure under a non-static assumption, which depended on the depth of the hierarchy. Recently, applied the dual system encryption concept proposed by Waters (2009) to present a construction with short ciphertext. They presented the HIBE system in composite order groups of three primes and achieved full security under static assumptions.
In the existing HIBE constructions, a maximum hierarchy depth had to be fixed at setup phase except the HIBE scheme proposed by Lewko and Waters (2011) . They presented a HIBE scheme, which is "unbounded" in the sense that the public parameters do not impose additional limitations on the functionality of the system. They employed a secretsharing technique to overcome the limitations of the previous HIBE constructions. We use 
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User Delegate (Secure channel) Fig. 1 to illustrate Lewko and Waters's HIBE scheme, in which α is the system's secret key. A user id at level j in their HIBE scheme can obtain its associated private key D id from the PKG or its ancestors. Then the user id at level j can use its associated private key D id to delegate private keys to its subordinates. Obviously, any user in their HIBE scheme can revoke its illegal or expired subordinates when this user stops to delegate new private keys to these subordinates. Thus, a secure channel needs to be established to transmit its subordinates' new private keys for each period.
As we all know, any public key system must provide a revocation mechanism to remove illegal or expired users from the system. For this problem, Boneh and Franklin (2001) suggested that the PKG generates all non-revoked users' new private keys of each period and then uses secure channels to transmit these periodic private keys to non-revoked users. For reducing the PKG and user's periodic computational workload, Boldyreva et al. (2008) proposed an IBE scheme with efficient revocation that used a binary tree structure to reduce the key update size to logarithmic in the number of users. Their IBE scheme is proven selectively secure in the standard model. Later on, Libert and Vergnaud (2009) improved Boldyreva et al.' s scheme to present another IBE scheme with efficient revocation that is proven adaptively secure in the standard model. However, in both schemes, each user must keep 3 log n private keys while the PKG needs to maintain a binary tree data structure of n leaf nodes, where n denotes the total number of users.
Up to now, there was little work on studying the revocation problem of HIBE systems. Certainly, all existing IBE systems can inherit the revocation method suggested by Boneh and Franklin to revoke illegal or expired users. However, the HIBE constructions using Boneh and Franklin's revocation method will require enormous computational cost between users and their ancestors in each period because computational workload for encrypting and decrypting the new private keys are required for each period.
Contribution
In this paper, we will propose the first revocable HIBE (RHIBE) scheme with public revocation mechanism in the standard model, which is extended from Lewko and Waters's unbounded HIBE scheme (2011) . We first present the framework of the new RHIBE construction with public revocation mechanism. For security model, we consider all adversarial capabilities of the standard HIBE security notions. We define the RHIBE's security notions based on the complete security definitions presented in Shi and Waters (2008) , which keep track of how keys are generated and delegated. Following the framework of RHIBE with public revocation mechanism, we propose a concrete RHIBE scheme from bilinear pairings in the standard model. For the security of proposed RHIBE scheme, we use the identical technique of the nested dual system encryption in Lewko and Waters (2011) to prove that it is fully secure while removing the requirement of secure channels for private key updating, and remaining the merits of Lewko and Waters's HIBE scheme.
We employ a transformation technique to convert Lewko and Waters's unbounded HIBE scheme (2011) to our RHIBE scheme, in which a user's private key (decryption key) is divided into two components including a fixed initial secret key and a changed time update key along with periods. The point is that any user needs to get both the fixed initial secret key and the changed time update key to decrypt his/her ciphertext. If a receiver obtains only either the fixed initial secret key or the changed time update key, the receiver cannot get the complete private key. For increasing the flexibility of the proposed RHIBE system in revoking illegal or expired users, a delegated revocation authority (DRA) is involved into the proposed RHIBE scheme and it can assist the PKG to revoke any users in the whole system, while remaining the ability of users at high level revoking their subordinates.
Without loss of generality, we use Fig. 2 to illustrate our proposed RHIBE scheme, in which α and β are the system's secret keys. The PKG gives the DRA the secret key β via a secure channel. A new user id at level j can obtain its associated initial secret key D id from the PKG or its ancestors via a secure channel. In the present period, a non-revoked user id at level j can also get the current time update key T id,t from the DRA or its ancestors via a public channel (e.g. E-mail system). The user id then can use its initial secret key D id and time update key T id,t to compute its current decryption key. Obviously, if the DRA or its ancestors stop to issue the current time update key for the user id at level j , it means that the user id has been revoked. As compared to Boneh and Franklin's revocation method, our revocation mechanism can reduce the computational workload of encryption and decryption procedures for periodic key updating.
Although involving a DRA into the RHIBE scheme can provide the revocation flexibility, it could also increase the computational cost as compared to the original HIBE 
(Secure channel)
The PKG uses ! to compute
The DRA uses to compute
(Public channel)
The user id uses Did and Tid,t to compute the entire decryption key Did,t scheme. If we remove the DRA role from the RHIBE scheme, the work of the DRA must be performed by the PKG. As a result, the system can remain the efficiency of encryption and decryption procedures. For showing the generality of the transformation technique, we also present another RHIBE scheme without a DRA in the random oracle model, which is extended from a famous HIBE scheme proposed by Gentry and Silverberg (2002) . The proposed RHIBE scheme without a DRA remains the efficiency of encryption and decryption procedures as compared to Gentry and Silverberg's HIBE scheme (2002) . Indeed, we believe that the transformation technique is suitable to construct RHIBE schemes with/without the DRA from some existing HIBE schemes. Here, we summarize our concrete work and contributions in this paper:
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(1) The framework and security notions of RHIBE with public revocation mechanism are defined. Meanwhile, the first RHIBE scheme is proposed and proved to be fully secure in the standard model. (2) A DRA role is added to assist the PKG to revoke illegal or expired users in the whole system. As a result, it may provide the flexibility for revoking illegal or expired users. (3) We present a transformation technique to convert a HIBE scheme to a RHIBE scheme. Finally, we employ it to present another concrete RHIBE scheme without a DRA in the random oracle model.
Organization
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Preliminaries are given in Section 2. In Section 3, we formally present the framework and security notions of RHIBE with public revocation mechanism. The concrete RHIBE scheme is proposed in Section 4. We analyze the security of the proposed RHIBE scheme in Section 5. We discuss the transformation technique from a HIBE scheme to a RHIBE scheme and employ it to present another RHIBE scheme in Section 6. Section 7 demonstrates comparisons and performance analysis. Conclusions are given in Section 8.
Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly introduce the concept of bilinear pairings and the related assumptions (Boneh et al., 2005a; Lewko and Waters, 2011) . Meanwhile, we review Lewko and Waters's HIBE scheme (2011) and the concept of dual system encryption.
Bilinear Pairings
Let G 1 and G 2 be two cyclic groups of order N = p 1 p 2 p 3 , where p 1 , p 2 , p 3 are three distinct primes. In particular, the composite order bilinear group was first introduced in Boneh et al. (2005b) . A bilinear mapê : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 must satisfy the following properties:
(1) Bilinear:ê(P a , Q b ) =ê(P , Q) ab for all P , Q ∈ G 1 and a, b ∈ Z * N . (2) Non-degenerate: there exists a value P ∈ G 1 such thatê(P , P ) has order N in G 2 . (3) Computable: the group operations in both G 1 and G 2 , and the mapê are computable in polynomial time with respect to a security parameter.
Let G p i denote the subgroup of order p i in G 1 , where i = 1, 2, 3, and G p i p j denote the subgroup of order p i p j in G 1 , where i, j = 1, 2, 3 and i = j . Note that these subgroups G p i are "orthogonal" each other under the bilinear mapê. That is, if h i ∈ G p i and h j ∈ G p j for i = j , thenê(h i , h j ) is the identity element in G 2 . Assume that g i is a generator of G p i , where i = 1, 2, 3. We then have that every element in G 1 can be expressed as g 
Complexity Assumptions
Our RHIBE scheme is extended from Lewko and Waters's unbounded HIBE scheme (2011) . The security of Lewko and Waters's unbounded HIBE scheme is based on special cases of the general subgroup decision assumption defined in Bellare et al. (2011) . The security of our RHIBE scheme has identical assumptions as in Lewko and Waters (2011) except Assumption 2. We first define the notation X R ← S to express that X is chosen uniformly randomly from the finite set S.
A
1. Let G be a group generator, we define the following distribution: Given
). The successful probability (advantage) of the adversary A in breaking Assumption 1 is presented as Adv1
the probability is over the random choice consumed by the probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A. We say that G satisfies Assumption 1 if Adv1 G,A is a negligible function for any PPT adversary A.
A 2. Let G be a group generator, we define the following distribution:
The successful probability (advantage) of the adversary A in breaking Assumption 2 is presented as
where the probability is over the random choice consumed by the PPT adversary A. We say that G satisfies Assumption 2 if Adv2 G,A is a negligible function for any PPT adversary A.
A 3. Let G be a group generator, we define the following distribution: Given
The successful probability (advantage) of the adversary A in breaking Assumption 3 is presented as
where the probability is over the random choice consumed by the PPT adversary A. We say that G satisfies Assumption 3 if Adv3 G,A is a negligible function for any PPT adversary A.
A 4. Let G be a group generator, we define the following distribution: Given
The successful probability (advantage) of the adversary A in breaking Assumption 4 is presented as
where the probability is over the random choice consumed by the PPT adversary A. We say that G satisfies Assumption 4 if Adv4 G,A is a negligible function for any PPT adversary A.
Lewko and Waters's Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption
Lewko and Waters's HIBE scheme includes five algorithms: System setup, Encryption, Key extract, Delegate and Decryption algorithms. They assumed that identity vectors are encoded such that if the identity vector id = (id 1 , . . . , id j ) is not a prefix of identity vector
• System setup: A trusted private key generation (PKG) takes a security parameter l as input of the System setup algorithm. The algorithm generates two groups G 1 and G 2 of order N = p 1 p 2 p 3 , where p 1 , p 2 , p 3 are distinct primes, and an admissible bilinear mapê :
denote a generator of G p 2 and g 3 denote a generator of G p 3 . The algorithm randomly chooses g, u, h, v, w from G p 1 , and α from Z N . Finally, the algorithm returns the system secret key α to the PKG and publishes the public parameters Parms = (N, G 1 , G 2 ,ê, g, u, h, v, w,ê(g, g) α ).
• Encryption: Given a message M and a receiver id = (id 1 , . . . , id j ), a sender chooses random values s, m 1 , . . . , m j ∈ Z N and computes the ciphertext as
• Key extract: Given a user's identity id = (id 1 , . . . , id j ), the PKG chooses random values r 1 , . . . , r j , y 1 , . . . , y j from Z N and random values λ 1 , . . . , λ j ∈ Z N subject to the constraint that α = λ 1 + λ 2 + · · · + λ j . Finally, the PKG computes the private key
, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , j } and transmits D id to the user via a secure channel.
• Delegate: Given a private key
Finally, this algorithm computes the secret key
and d j +1,3 are defined to be the identity element in G 1 .
• Decryption: Given a ciphertext C = (C 0 , C 1 , C i,2 , C i,3 , C i,4 ), ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , j }, the receiver can use the private key
Lewko and Waters (2011) used the nested dual system encryption argument (Waters, 2009 ) to prove full security of their HIBE scheme. Beside the five algorithms above, a dual system encryption HIBE scheme has two extra algorithms Encryption SF and Key extract SF, which produces semi-functional ciphertexts and keys, respectively. Note that the encryption SF and key extract SF algorithms are used only for the security proof and not for the normal operation of the scheme.
• Encryption SF: The semi-functional encryption algorithm first calls the encryption algorithm to obtain a normal ciphertext C = (C 0 , C 1 , C i,2 , C i,3 , C i,4 ), ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , j }. This algorithm chooses random values γ , δ ∈ Z N and computes the semi-functional ciphertext as
The semi-functional key extract algorithm first calls the key extract algorithm to obtain a normal private key
This algorithm chooses random values ζ , η,ŷ ∈ Z N and computes the semifunctional private key as
In the dual system encryption HIBE scheme, ciphertexts and keys can take two forms: normal and semi-functional. By running Encryption and Key extract algorithms, we can get the normal ciphertexts and keys, respectively. By running Encryption SF and Key extract SF algorithms, we can get the semi-functional ciphertexts and keys, respectively. Normal keys can decrypt both normal and semi-functional ciphertexts, while semifunctional keys can decrypt only normal ciphertexts.
Framework and Security Notions of RHIBE
In this section, we formally define the framework and security notions of revocable hierarchical ID-based encryption (RHIBE) with public revocation mechanism. Following the framework and security notions of HIBE presented by Lewko and Waters (2011) , we redefine the framework of RHIBE by adding Time key update and Time key delegate algorithms. We define the new framework and security notions of RHIBE in the following subsections.
Framework of RHIBE
A RHIBE scheme consists of seven algorithms: System setup, Encryption, Initial key extract, Initial key delegate, Time key update, Time key delegate and Decryption algorithms:
• System setup: This algorithm is a probabilistic algorithm which takes as input a security parameter l and the total number T of all periods, it returns a system secret key α, a time secret key β and the public parameters Parms. The public parameters Parms are made public and implicitly inputted to all the following algorithms.
• Encryption: Take an identity vector id and a message M as input, the algorithm generates a ciphertext C.
• Initial key extract: Take the system secret key α and a user's identity vector id as input, the algorithm returns the user's initial secret key D id .
• Initial key delegate: Take the initial secret key D id for the identity vector id = (id 1 , . . . , id j ) and a user's identity id ′ = (id 1 , . . . , id j , id j +1 ) as input, the algorithm returns the user's initial secret key D ′ id for the identity vector id ′ . Here, the vector id = (id 1 , . . . , id j ) is the user's identity at level j and the vector id ′ = (id 1 , . . . , id j , id j +1 ) is the user's identity at level j + 1.
• Time key update: For a period t, take the time secret key β and a user's identity vector id as input, the algorithm returns the user's time update key T id,t . Note that the non-revoked user can use the initial secret key D id and the time update key T id,t to obtain the decryption key D id,t .
• Time key delegate: For a period t, take the time update key T id,t for identity vector id = (id 1 , . . . , id j ) and a user's identity id ′ = (id 1 , . . . , id j , id j +1 ) as input, the algorithm returns the user's time update key T id ′ ,t for identity vector id ′ .
• Decryption: The algorithm takes a ciphertext C and the user's decryption key D id,t as input. If the identity vector of the secret key id is a prefix of the identity vector used to encrypt the ciphertext, and the key and ciphertext are not both semi-functional, the algorithm returns a plaintext M.
As mentioned in Section 2.3, we also use the nested dual system encryption argument to prove full security of the dual system encryption RHIBE scheme. We define three semifunctional algorithms as follows:
• Encryption SF: Take an identity vector id and a message M as input, the algorithm generates a semi-functional ciphertextC.
• Initial key extract SF: Take the system secret key α and a user's identity vector id as input, the algorithm returns the user's semi-functional initial secret keyD id .
• Time key update SF: For a period t, take the time secret key β and a user's identity vector id as input, the algorithm returns the user's semi-functional time update keyT id,t .
Security Model of RHIBE
We extend the security definition of Lewko and Waters's HIBE scheme (2011) to define the security game of RHIBE scheme, called Game RHIBE. We also use the complete security definition presented in Shi and Waters (2008) , which keeps track of how keys are generated and delegated. D 1. We say that a RHIBE scheme is secure if no PPT adversary A has a nonnegligible advantage in the following Game RHIBE played with a challenger B.
• Phase 1. The challenger B runs System setup algorithm of RHIBE to generate a system secret key α and a time secret key β, and produce the public parameters Parms. Then the challenger B gives the adversary A the Parms and keeps the system secret key α and time secret key β to itself. We let S and V denote the sets of initial secret keys and time update keys, respectively, that the challenger has created but not yet given to the adversary. We initialize S = and V = .
• Phase 2. The adversary A may issue a number of different queries to B as follows:
-Initial key create query. Upon receiving this query with an identity vector id = (id 1 , . . . , id j ) at level j , the challenger B runs Initial key extract algorithm to generate the initial secret key D id and places this key in the set S. The challenger B gives the adversary A only a reference to this initial secret key D id , not the key D id itself.
-Initial key delegate query. Upon receiving this query with an initial secret key D id in the set S and an identity vector id ′ = (id 1 , . . . , id j , id j +1 ) at level j + 1, the challenger B runs Initial key delegate algorithm to generate an initial secret key D id ′ for the identity vector id ′ . The challenger B adds this key to the set S and gives the adversary A only a reference not the actual key. -Initial key reveal query. Upon receiving this query with an element of the set S, the challenger B gives this initial secret key to the adversary A and removes it from the set S. We note that the adversary A needs no longer to make any initial key delegation queries for this initial secret key because it can run Initial key delegate algorithm on the revealed key for itself. in the set V and an identity vector id ′ = (id 1 , . . . , id j , id j +1 ) at level j + 1 for a period t, the challenger B runs Time key delegate algorithm to generate time update key T id ′ ,t for this new identity vector id ′ . The challenger B adds this key to the set V and gives the adversary A only a reference not the actual key.
-Time key reveal query. Upon receiving this query with an element of the set V , the challenger B gives this time update key to the adversary A and removes it from the set V . We note that the adversary A needs no longer to make any time key delegate queries for this time update key because it can run Time key delegate algorithm on the revealed key for itself.
• Phase 3. The adversary A gives a target identity vector id * , a period t * and a plaintext pair (M * 0 , M * 1 ) to B. A restriction here is that either id * or (id * , t * ) did not appear in Phase 2. This identity vector must satisfy the property that no revealed identity in Phase 2 was a prefix of it. Then the challenger B chooses a random b ∈ {0, 1} and computes C * by running the Encryption algorithm. Then B sends C * to A.
• Phase 4. The adversary A may issue more queries as in Phase 2. A restriction here is that either id * or (id * , t * ) is disallowed to be queried in Phase 2. Any revealed identity in Phase 2 was not a prefix of id * .
• Phase 5. The adversary A outputs b ′ ∈ {0, 1} and wins this game if b ′ = b.
We define the adversary A's advantage in attacking the RHIBE scheme in the security game as Adv RHIBE
Concrete Dual System Encryption RHIBE Scheme
In this section, we extend Lewko and Waters's dual system encryption HIBE scheme (2011) to propose the concrete dual system encryption RHIBE scheme. We involve a delegated revocation authority (DRA) into our RHIBE scheme, which is different from the dual system encryption HIBE scheme. In the proposed RHIBE scheme, there are three roles: a trusted PKG, a trusted DRA and users. The trusted PKG can delegate the time secret key to the DRA, which can assist the PKG to revoke misbehaving/compromised users from the system. It is obvious that the PKG can also perform the same work.
Our proposed RHIBE scheme consists of seven algorithms: System setup, Encryption, Initial key extract, Initial key delegate, Time key update, Time key delegate and Decryption algorithms.
• System setup: A trusted PKG takes a security parameter l and the total number T of periods as input. The PKG generates two groups G 1 and G 2 of order N = p 1 p 2 p 3 , where p 1 , p 2 , p 3 are distinct primes, and a bilinear mapê :
Let G p i denote the subgroup of p i in G 1 . Let g 2 denote a generator of G p 2 and g 3 denote a generator of G p 3 . The PKG randomly chooses g, u, h, v, w, z, f from G p 1 , and α, β from Z N . Finally, the PKG keeps the system secret key α and the time secret key β for itself, and publishes the public parameters Parms
. Then, the PKG transmits the time secret key β to the DRA via a secure channel.
• Encryption: For a period t, given a message M and a receiver id = (id 1 , . . . , id j ), a sender chooses random values s, m 1 , . . . , m j ∈ Z N and computes the ciphertext as
• Initial key extract: Given a user's identity id = (id 1 , . . . , id j ), the PKG chooses random values r 1 , . . . , r j , y 1 , . . . , y j from Z N and random values λ 1 , . . . , λ j ∈ Z N subject to the constraint that α = λ 1 + λ 2 + · · · + λ j . Finally, the PKG computes the initial secret key
• Initial key delegate: The algorithm takes input an initial secret key
, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , j } for a user's identity id = (id 1 , . . . , id j ) and a level j + 1 identity id ′ = (id 1 , . . . , id j , id j +1 ). Then, it chooses random values
• Time key update: Given a user's identity ID = (id 1 , . . . , id j ) and a period t ∈ [1, T], the DRA chooses random values k 1 , . . . , k j , x 1 , . . . , x j from Z N and random values µ 1 , . . . , µ j ∈ Z N subject to the constraint β = µ 1 + µ 2 + · · · + µ j . Finally, the PKG computes the time update key T id,t = (t i,0 , t i,1 , t i,2 , t i,3 ) = (g µ i w x i , g x i , v x i (z t ·id i f ) k i , g k i ), ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , j }. Then the DRA transmits T id,t to the user via a public channel (e.g., E-mail system). Thus, the user can use D id and T id,t to compute the decryption key for the period t as
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , j }.
• Time key delegate: The algorithm takes input a time update key T id,t = (t i,0 , t i,1 , t i,2 , t i,3 ), ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , j } for user's identity id = (id 1 , . . . , id j ) for a period t and a level j + 1 identity id ′ = (id 1 , . . . , id j , id j +1 ). Then, it chooses random values
Finally, this algorithm computes the time update key
), ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , j + 1}, where t j +1,0 , t j +1,1 , t j +1,2 and t j +1,3 are defined to be the identity element in G 1 .
• Decryption: Given a ciphertext C = (C 0 , C 1 , C i,2 , C i,3 , C i,4 , C i,5 ), ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , j }, the receiver can use the private key
. . , id j ) in a period t to decrypt C as follows: 
As defined in Section 3.1, we need three semi-functional algorithms (Encryption SF, Initial key extract SF and Time key update SF) for the proof of the full security in our dual system encryption RHIBE scheme. Encryption SF, Initial key extract SF and Time key update SF algorithms produce semi-functional ciphertexts, initial secret keys and time update keys, respectively. Note that three algorithms are used only for the security proof and not for the normal operation of the system.
• Encryption SF: For a period t, the semi-functional encryption algorithm first calls the Encryption algorithm to obtain a normal ciphertext C = (C 0 , C 1 , C i,2 , C i,3 , C i,4 , C i,5 ), ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , j }. This algorithm then chooses random values γ , δ ∈ Z N and computes a semi-functional ciphertext as
• Initial key extract SF: The semi-functional initial key extract algorithm first calls the initial key extract algorithm to obtain a normal initial secret key
, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , j }. This algorithm chooses random values ζ, η,ŷ j ∈ Z N and computes the semi-functional initial secret key as
• Time key update SF: The semi-functional time key update algorithm first calls the time key update algorithm to obtain a normal time update key T id,t = (t i,0 , t i,1 , t i,2 , t i,3 ), ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , j }. This algorithm chooses random values σ, ω,x j ∈ Z N and computes the semi-functional time update key as
Security Analysis
Lewko and Waters (2011) used the nested dual system encryption argument (Waters, 2009) to prove full security of their HIBE scheme. We will use the same technique to prove our proposed RHIBE scheme. As similar to the proof of Lewko and Waters's dual system encryption HIBE scheme, we first define several variations of Game RHIBE.
Game RHIBE WD : Game RHIBE WD is the same as Game RHIBE, except without delegation (initial key delegate and time key delegate). For initial key delegation, instead of making initial key create, initial key delegate and initial key reveal queries, the adversary simply makes initial key extract queries to the challenger. For time key delegation, instead of making time key create, time key delegate, and time key reveal queries, the adversary simply makes time key update queries. The only restriction is that no queried identity vectors can be prefixes of the challenge identity vector provided for the challenge ciphertext.
Game RHIBE C : Game RHIBE C is the same as Game RHIBE WD , except that the challenge ciphertext is generated by a call to Encrypt SF algorithm instead of Encrypt algorithms (i.e. a semi-functional ciphertext is given to the adversary).
Game RHIBE SF : Game RHIBE SF is the same as Game RHIBE C , except that the challenger replaces all Initial key extract and Time key update calls with calls to Initial key extract SF and Time key update SF algorithms, respectively. In other words, the challenge ciphertext, all the initial secret keys and all the time update keys given to the adversary will be semi-functional.
As similar to four security properties of Lewko and Waters's dual system encryption HIBE scheme, now we also define four security properties for our dual system encryption RHIBE as follows.
Initial Key and Time Key Delegation Invariance:
We say that a dual system encryption RHIBE scheme D has initial key and time key delegation invariance if for any PPT adversary A, there exists another PPT adversary A ′ such that the advantage of A in Game RHIBE is negligibly close to advantage of A ′ in Game RHIBE WD . We denote this as follows:
Semi-Functional Ciphertext Invariance:
We say that a dual system encryption RHIBE scheme D has semi-functional ciphertext invariance if for any PPT adversary A, the advantage of A in Game RHIBE WD is negligibly close to its advantage in Game RHIBE C . We denote this as follows:
Semi-Functional Initial Key and Time Key Invariance:
We say that a dual system encryption RHIBE scheme D has semi-functional initial key and time key invariance if for any PPT adversary A, the advantage of A in Game RHIBE C is negligibly close to its advantage in Game RHIBE SF . We denote this as follows:
Semi-Functional Security:
We say that a dual system encryption RHIBE scheme D has semi-functional security if for any PPT adversary A, the advantages of A in Game RHIBE SF is negligible. We denote this as follows: 
Thus, by the triangle inequality, we may conclude that
The quantity Adv RHIBE A (l) must be negligible in the above triangle inequality, because semi-functional security is an existing property that implies the quantity Adv
is negligible. Thus, we can say that the RHIBE scheme is secure.
In the following, we will give four lemmas to prove that our dual system encryption RHIBE scheme D = (System setup, Encryption, Encryption SF, Initial key extract, Initial key extract SF, Initial key delegate, Time key update, Time key update SF, Time key delegate and Decryption) has four security properties that include initial key and time key delegation invariance, semi-functional ciphertext invariance, semi-functional initial key and time key invariance, as well as semi-functional security. We omit the complete proofs of some lemmas here, since they are very similar to the proofs of Lewko and Waters's dual system encryption RHIBE (2011). Lemma 1. Our dual system encryption RHIBE scheme has initial key and time key delegation invariance.
Proof. For initial key delegation invariance, Initial key delegate algorithm additively uses random values
It is obvious that the distribution of this initial secret key obtained through any sequence of delegations is the same as the distribution of the initial secret key for the same identity vector generated by a direct call to Initial key extract algorithm. For time key delegation invariance, Time key delegate algorithm additively uses random values
It is also obvious that the distribution of this time update key obtained through any sequence of delegations is the same as the distribution of the time update key for the same identity vector and period generated by a direct call to Time key update algorithm.
For any PPT adversary A in Game RHIBE, we can define a PPT adversary A ′ in Game RHIBE WD that obtains the same advantage. When A makes initial key create, initial key delegate, time key create and time key delegate queries, A ′ makes no query. If A makes initial key reveal queries, then A ′ makes initial key extract queries for the same identity. When A makes time key reveal queries, then A ′ makes time key update queries for the same identity and period. Since the initial secret keys and the time update keys that A ′ obtains have the same distribution as those keys that A obtains, their advantages are identical.
Lemma 2. Under Assumption 1, our dual system encryption RHIBE scheme has semifunctional ciphertext invariance.
Proof. Assume that there exists an adversary A who can obtain a non-negligible difference in advantage between Game RHIBE WD and Game RHIBE C . We may construct a PPT algorithm B to break Assumption 1 with non-negligible advantage.
We assume that the algorithm B is given g ∈ G p 1 and T . B then chooses a, b, c, d, m, n, α, β from Z N and gives the public parameters Parms = (N, G 1 , G 2 ,ê, g, u = g a , h = g b , v = g c , w = g d , z = g m , f = g n ,ê(g, g) α ,ê(g, g) β ) to the adversary A. The algorithm B can use the system secret keys α and the time secret key β to respond to A's initial secret key and time update key requests by calling Initial key extract and Time key update algorithms to return A the resulting keys, respectively.
At some point, the adversary A provides a plaintext pair (M * 0 , M * 1 ), a target identity vector id * and a period t * to the algorithm B. B then chooses random values m 1 , . . . , m j ∈ Z N and b ∈ {0, 1}, and computes the ciphertext C * as follows:
Since C * 1 = T , it implicitly sets g s equal to the G p 1 part of T . Meanwhile, we have the simulation of the ciphertext C * as follows:
If T ∈ G p 1 , C * is a well-distributed normal ciphertext, and B has properly simulated Game RHIBE WD . If T ∈ G p 1 p 2 , C * is a well-distributed semi-functional ciphertext (since the value of d modulo p 2 is uncorrelated from its value modulo p 1 by the Chinese Remainder Theorem). Hence, B has properly simulated Game RHIBE C in this case. By the above discussions, we say that B perfectly simulates the ciphertext C * . Thus, B can use the output of A to achieve a non-negligible advantage against Assumption 1. It is obvious that the successful probability of B in breaking Assumption 1 is presented as Adv1
Lemma 3. Under Assumptions 3 and 4, our dual system encryption RHIBE scheme has semi-functional initial key and semi-functional time key invariance.
Proof. Under Assumptions 3 and 4, Lewko and Waters (2011) had proven that their dual system encryption HIBE has semi-functional key invariance. As presented in Section 2.3, the semi-functional key is
In our dual system encryption RHIBE, the semi-functional initial secret key and the semifunctional time update key arẽ
Obviously, the generations of our semi-functional initial key and the semi-functional time key are the same as the generation of Lewko and Waters's semi-functional key. Hence, we can say that our dual system encryption RHIBE scheme has semi-functional initial key and semi-functional time key invariance. Here, we omit the complete proof.
Lemma 4. Under Assumption 2, our dual system encryption RHIBE scheme has semifunctional security.
Proof. Assume that there exists an adversary A who can obtain a non-negligible advantage in Game RHIBE SF . We may construct a PPT algorithm B to break Assumption 2 with non-negligible advantage. We assume that B is given g, g 2 , g 3 , g α X 2 , g β X 2 , g s Y 2 and T . B chooses a, b, c, d, m, n from Z N and gives the public parameters Parms = (N, G 1 , G 2 ,ê, g, u = g a , h = g b , v = g c , w = g d , z = g m , f = g n ,ê(g, g α X 2 ),ê(g, g β X 2 )) to A. Assume that B does not know the system secret key α and the time secret key β.
Upon receiving an initial secret key query with identity id = (id 1 , . . . , id j ), B will generate a semi-functional initial secret key as follows. B chooses random values r 1 , . . . , r j , y 1 , . . . , y j −1 , y ′ j , λ 1 , . . . , λ j −1 , λ ′ j ∈ Z N subject to the constraint that λ 1 +λ 2 + · · · + λ j −1 + λ ′ j = 0. Since λ 1 + λ 2 + · · · + λ j = α, it will implicitly set λ j = α + λj ′ mod p 1 and y j = α + y ′ j mod p 1 . B also chooses a random valuek ∈ Z N . The semi-functional initial secret key is presented as:
Observe that this is a well-distributed semi-functional key with the following equation
and ŷ j =k + log g 2 X 2 mod p 2 , y j =k mod p 3
we have that the resulting keyD id is a well-distributed semi-functional initial secret key. Note thatŷ j is freshly random modulo p 2 and p 3 for each key, while ζ and η are the same for all keys, as specified by Initial key extract SF algorithm. Upon receiving a time update key query with identity id = (id 1 , . . . , id j ) in a period t, B will generate a semi-functional time update key as follows. B chooses random values k 1 , . . . , k j , x 1 , . . . , x j −1 , x ′ j , µ 1 , . . . , µ j −1 , µ ′ j ∈ Z N subject to the constraint that µ 1 + µ 2 +· · ·+µ j −1 +µ ′ j = 0. Since µ 1 +µ 2 +· · ·+µ j = β, it will implicitly set µ j = β +µ ′ j mod p 1 and x j = β + x ′ j mod p 1 . The algorithm B also chooses a random valuel ∈ Z N . The semi-functional time update key is presented as:
By observing the following equation
, and x j =l + log g 2 X 2 mod p 2 , x j =l mod p 3
we have thatT id,t is also a well-distributed semi-functional time update key. Notice that x j is freshly random modulo p 2 and p 3 for each key, while σ and ω are the same for all keys, as specified by Time key update SF algorithm. At some point, A provides a plaintext pair (M * 0 , M * 1 ), a target identity vector id * and a period t * , and requests the challenge ciphertext C * . The algorithm B chooses random values m 1 , . . . , m j , δ ′ ∈ Z N and b ∈ {0, 1}, and computes the ciphertext as follows:
As mentioned in Assumption 2, if T =ê(g, g) (α+β)·s , this is a well-distributed semifunctional encryption of Mb with the following equation
Notice that δ ′ randomizes this so that there is no correlation with d mod p 2 . Hence, this is uncorrelated from the exponents modulo p 2 of the semi-functional initial secret and time update keys. Thus B has properly simulated Game RHIBE SF .
If T is a random element of G 2 , then this is a semi-functional encryption of a random message. The advantage of A must be zero, because the ciphertext contains no information about b. Since we have assumed the advantage of A is non-negligible in Game RHIBE SF , B can use the output of A to achieve a non-negligible advantage against Assumption 2. It is obvious that the successful probability of B in breaking Assumption 2 is presented as
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 1-4, our proposed RHIBE scheme is fully secure.
Proof. By Lemmas 1-4, we have proven that our proposed RHIBE scheme has initial key and time key delegation invariance, semi-functional ciphertext invariance, semifunctional initial key and time key invariance, and semi-functional security. By Theorem 1, we can say that our proposed RHIBE scheme is fully secure.
Transformation from HIBE to RHIBE
Actually, in most of the existing HIBE systems, users hold only one private key or one set of private keys. As presented in Section 4, we have proposed a concrete RHIBE scheme with public revocation mechanism, which is extended from Lewko and Waters's HIBE scheme. In our proposed RHIBE scheme, it is easy to see that one private key is divided into a fixed initial secret key and a changed time update key along with periods. The fixed initial secret key is identical to the private key in Lewko and Waters's HIBE scheme. The changed time update key is generated by the DRA who can assist the PKG to revoke illegal or expired users from the system. The point is that any user in our proposed RHIBE scheme needs to get both the fixed initial secret key and the changed time update key to decrypt his/her ciphertext. If a receiver obtains only either the fixed initial secret key or the changed time update key, the receiver cannot get the complete private key.
In the same way, we show that the transformation technique is also suitable to construct a RHIBE scheme from a HIBE scheme in the random oracle model. In the following, we will present another RHIBE scheme from a famous HIBE scheme proposed by Gentry and Silverberg (2002) .
Since we do not use bilinear groups of the composite order as in Section 2.1, we briefly redefine some parameters as follows. Let G 1 and G 2 be additive and multiplicative cyclic groups of large prime order q, respectively. An admissible bilinear mapê : G 1 ×G 1 → G 2 must satisfy the following properties:
(1) Bilinear: For all P , Q ∈ G 1 , and a, b ∈ Z * q , we haveê(aP , bQ) =ê(P , Q) ab . (2) Non-degenerate: There exist P , Q ∈ G 1 such thatê(P , Q) = 1. (3) Computable: For P , Q ∈ G 1 , there exists an efficient algorithm to computê e(P , Q).
We assumed that a user ID's position in the following RHIBE scheme is defined by ID-tuple (ID 1 , . . . , ID j ). The user ID's ancestors in the following RHIBE scheme are the PKG and users in lower level whose ID-tuple is { (ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID i ): 1 i < j }. The concrete RHIBE scheme is presented as follows:
• Setup: Given a security parameter k and the total number T of periods, a trusted private key generator (PKG) generates two groups G 1 , G 2 of prime order q > 2 k , an admissible bilinear mapê : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 and a generator P 0 of G 1 . The PKG performs the following tasks:
(1) Randomly choose a system secret key s 0 ∈ Z * q and set Q 0 = s 0 · P 0 . (2) Pick three hash functions H 1 : {0, 1} * → G 1 , H 2 : {0, 1} * → G 1 and H 3 : G 2 → {0, 1} n for some n.
The message space is M = {0, 1} n . The ciphertext space is C = G j 1 × {0, 1} n , where j is the level of the recipient. Then the public parameters are presented as Parms = {G 1 , G 2 ,ê, P 0 , Q 0 , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 }.
• Lower-level setup: An entity ID j ∈ Level j picks a random s j ∈ Z * q as its secret key.
• Initial key extract: Given an entity ID j 's ID-tuple (ID 1 , . . . , ID j ) at Level j , where (ID − 1, . . ., ID i ), for 1 i < j , is the ID-tuple of an entity ID j 's ancestor at Level i . Then ID j 's parent performs the following tasks:
(1) Compute P j = H 1 (ID 1 , . . . , ID j ) ∈ G 1 .
(2) Set D 0 to be the identity element of G 1 and compute ID j 's initial secret key D j as follows:
(3) Give the values of Q i = s i · P 0 for 1 i j − 1 to an entity ID j .
• Time key update: In a period t, given a non-revoked entity ID j 's ID-tuple (ID 1 , . . . , ID j ) at Level j , where (ID 1 , . . . , ID i ), for 1 i < j , is the ID-tuple of an entity ID j 's ancestor at Level i . Then ID j 's parent performs the following tasks:
(2) Set R 0 to be the identity element of G 1 and set ID j 's time secret key R j as follows:
• Encryption: In a period t, given a message m and the ID-tuple (ID 1 , . . . , ID j ), a sender performs the following tasks:
Choose a random r ∈ Z * q . (3) Set the ciphertext for the message m to be:
r .
• Decryption: Given a ciphertext C = [U 0 , U 2 , . . . , U j , V ], the receiver ID j can use his/her initial secret key D j and time secret key R j to compute V ⊕
We present the correctness of the decryption equation as follows:
By the proposed RHIBE scheme above, it is obvious that the transformation technique is also suitable to construct a RHIBE scheme from a HIBE scheme in the random oracle model. In the meantime, readers can easily find that there exists no DRA in the proposed RHIBE above. The work of the DRA is performed by the PKG. Indeed, the system can remain the efficiency for encryption and decryption procedures as compared to Gentry and Silverberg's HIBE scheme (2002) . On the other hand, if we would like to increase the flexibility of the proposed RHIBE scheme for revoking illegal or expired users, a DRA can be involved into the proposed RHIBE scheme and it can assist the PKG to revoke any users in the whole system.
For the security of the proposed RHIBE scheme above, we can employ the work of Gentry and Silverberg (2002) to provide security proof in the random oracle model. In the security game of RHIBE scheme as mentioned in Section 3.2, a restriction in Phase 3 is that either id * or (id * , t * ) did not appear in Phase 2. It means that the adversary is allowed to query either the related information (including initial key create, delegate and reveal) of initial secret keys on id * or the related information (including time key create, delegate and reveal) of time update keys on (id * , t * ). Since the user's private key is divided into the initial secret key and the time update key, the adversary is unable to compute the user's private key. For simplicity of security proof, we consider two types of adversaries in the security game. One is an outside adversary who can be allowed to obtain the time update keys. The other is a revoked user who is unable to obtain its time update key in the present period, but the revoked user still owns the initial secret key. That is, the outside adversary is allowed to issue all queries in the security game except the related queries of initial secret key on id * , while the revoked user can issue all queries except the related queries of the time update key on (id * , t * ). For outside adversaries, we can employ the similar work of Gentry and Silverberg (2002) to prove that the proposed RHIBE in the random oracle model is secure. Certainly, we can also extend the work of Gentry and Silverberg (2002) to prove that the proposed RHIBE is secure for the attacks of revoked users. Here, we omit the security proofs.
Comparisons Between HIBE and RHIBE
Extended from Lewko and Waters's HIBE scheme (2011) (called LW-HIBE), we constructed the first RHIBE scheme (called LW-RHIBE) in the standard model (WROM). We also presented another RHIBE scheme (called GS-RHIBE) extended from Gentry and Silverberg's HIBE scheme (2002) (called GS-HIBE) in the random oracle model (ROM). Here, we make a comparison between the mentioned schemes in terms of security model, computational cost, revocable functionality and communication cost. Note that T p denotes the computational cost of a pairing operation and |C| denotes the bit length of C. Table 1 lists comparisons between our proposed RHIBE schemes and two original HIBE schemes (Lewko and Waters, 2011; Gentry and Silverberg, 2002) in terms of security model, encryption cost, decryption cost for each level, revocable functionality, and communication cost. For the decryption of the LW-HIBE scheme and our proposed LW-RHIBE scheme, they require four and five pairing operations for each level, respectively. Although our LW-RHIBE scheme increases one pairing operation as compared to the LW-HIBE scheme for the decryption procedure, but the point is that our LW-RHIBE scheme provides a flexible revocation mechanism with a DRA using a public channel. Certainly, we can also involve a DRA into the GS-RHIBE scheme to assist the PKG for sharing the responsibility of revoking illegal or expired users. Both the LW-HIBE and the GS-HIBE schemes may employ the revocation mechanism suggested by Boneh and Franklin (2001) , but they require secure channels to transmit the users' new private keys for each period. Thus, extra computational costs of encryption and decryption procedures for each period are required. Our proposed RHIBE schemes provide a public revocation mechanism to remove the requirement of secure channels and extra computational costs for periodic key updating required in the original HIBE schemes while remaining efficiency.
In the following, let us evaluate the communication cost. In the proposed GS-RHIBE scheme, the ciphertext is C = [U 0 , U 2 , . . . , U j , V ], where j is the position of level. The bit length of the ciphertext C is |U 0 | + |U 2 | + · · · + |U j | + |V |, where V is bounded to the hash function H 3 (). Since U 0 , U 2 , . . . , U j ∈ G 1 and H 3 is mapped to {0, 1} n , the bit length of the ciphertext is j |G 1 | + n. Considering the bit length of ciphertext in the proposed LW-RHIBE scheme, the sender transmits a ciphertext C = (C 0 , C 1 , C j,2 , C j,3 , C j,4 , C j,5 ) to the receiver, where j is the position of level. The bit length of the ciphertext C is |C 0 |+|C 1 |+|C j,2 |+|C j,3 |+|C j,4 |+|C j,5 |. Since C 0 ∈ G 2 and g, u, h, v, w, z, f ∈ G p 1 , where G p 1 is the subgroup of G 1 , the bit length of the ciphertext in the proposed LW-RHIBE scheme is (4j + 1)|G 1 | + |G 2 |, where j is the position of level.
Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a public revocation mechanism that is an exciting alternative to the existing revocation methods. We defined the framework of RHIBE scheme with public revocation mechanism. Meanwhile, its security notions were completely defined to formalize the possible threats. Based on Lewko and Waters's HIBE scheme, we employed the public revocation mechanism to propose a concrete RHIBE scheme. We have proven that the proposed RHIBE scheme is fully secure in the standard model while removing the requirement of secure channels for private key updating, and remaining the merits of Lewko and Waters's HIBE scheme. We also employed the public revocation mechanism to propose another concrete RHIBE scheme in the random oracle model. For the revocation flexibility, we also consider the situation whether a DRA should be put in a RHIBE scheme. We demonstrated that our RHIBE schemes not only provide a public revocation mechanism but also remain efficiency in encryption and decryption procedures as compared with the original RHIBE schemes. Our transformation technique is suitable to construct RHIBE schemes from most of the existing HIBE schemes. In the future, a general transformation technique from any existing HIBE scheme to RHIBE scheme is an interesting research issue.
